

OBSERVATION REPORT

EUROPEAN BORDERS

# KEEP OUT?

ILLUSTRATED BY THE SITUATION IN CALAIS,  
CEUTA AND MELILLA, AND SICILY





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# INTRODUCTION

## European migration policy crisis

The “migrant crisis” or “refugee crisis” has dominated the news since 2015. However, above all, it is a crisis of European migration policies, which feed tension at the borders, as in Calais or on the Greek islands, leading to catastrophic humanitarian crises.

After back-to-back shipwrecks in the Mediterranean in April 2015 in which 1,200 people died, and the swell of emotion and outrage from the public seeing the photo of little Aylan, European leaders’ speeches quickly gave way to the priority of closing European borders. New mechanisms, such as hotspots, were announced, but in reality, they are aligned with the logic of the European migration policies implemented in recent years which aim to restrict and filter access to European territory.

What is changing is the intensification of the logic of deterrence and repression, and the speed with which European decisions are made and implemented, without any real democratic debate. More worrying still is the legitimisation of this logic by the EU and its Member States, which ultimately seems justified to a segment of public opinion, despite the grave consequences and ensuing decline in human rights protection.

In attempting to contain those coming from outside Europe, the EU Member States have turned Schengen external borders into places of physical and psychological violence where the basic human rights of migrants are being undermined. Calais (which shares a border with the United Kingdom), Melilla and Ceuta (the only European land borders on the Africa continent), or Pozzallo in Sicily, are emblematic of the implementation of these policies and their offshoots.

### PRESENTATION OF THE MISSIONS AND REPORT METHODOLOGY

This report is the result of an analysis of the EU’s decisions, an information watch and documentary research into European migration policies conducted throughout 2015 and early 2016, as well as several field missions.

In 2015, La Cimade conducted three cross-missions to the external borders of the Schengen Area, jointly with networks and partner associations<sup>1</sup>. A wealth of data was collected in Calais in February and

**EU Member States have turned external borders into places of violence where the basic human rights of migrants are being undermined.**

December; Ceuta and Melilla in June; and in Italy, specifically Sicily, in November. Many discussions were held with a multitude of actors, in addition to visits to migrant reception centres and camps, and through the observation of a landing in the port of Pozzallo, in Italy.


The context, very moving and uncertain since the start of the missions, complicated the writing of this report, which does not necessarily take the latest developments into account, notably the signing of the EU-Turkey Agreement and its implementation.

1. ARCI (Italian association), Gadem (Moroccan association), Migreurop (Euro-African network) and Migreurop Spain, APDHA (Spanish association) and Boats 4 People coalition.

## 01

## Blocking access to European territory at any cost, even lives

The current priority of the EU and its Member States is clear: to prevent newcomers to their territory by tightening up border controls and buying the support of neighbouring countries, directions that have been the essence of European migration policy since the 1990s. More than 20 years later, these guidelines are still being reaffirmed, and even getting stricter.



The triple Spanish border fence in Melilla, on the left side Europe, on the right side further away, Morocco, March 2015. © Elsa Tyszler

### 1.1 CALAIS AND THE ENCLAVES OF CEUTA AND MELILLA: COOPERATING TO CONTAIN "UNDESIRABLES"

"Cooperation with third countries" is a priority brandished by the EU, which hides the issue of the outsourcing of European borders or also called "externalisation". To prevent newcomers to its territory, the EU is trying to convince neighbouring countries to implement controls upstream. The idea is to prevent migrants from even leaving their country to come to Europe, and to have these countries accept the return on their soil of any person who still manage to reach European territory. This process of outsourcing European border control, subcontracted to neighbouring countries, is an old policy that is intensifying today, and which seems to be taking on a new direction with the scandalous agreement the EU signed with Turkey on March 18, 2016.

The same logic has been applied to the cooperation between Spain and Morocco, and between the United Kingdom and France, for over a decade. Externalisation in the area of asylum and immigration policies pursues a quadruple logic that is found at these two borders: relocate, outsource, privatise and remove responsibility.

Relocation aims to implement border controls as early as possible, from the countries of departure and transit of migrants. The implementation of controls is outsourced to Morocco by Spain, and to France by the UK. This logic is implemented through the negotiation of bilateral agreements and the granting of financial assistance, like Le Touquet Treaty signed between France and the United Kingdom in 2003 and various administrative arrangements and agreements.

Privatisation of controls occurs through the delegation of control to private companies such as the Eurotunnel Group. Finally, by shifting their policy of repression onto others, the United Kingdom and Spain are discharging their responsibility.

The cooperation between the United Kingdom and France, and between Spain and Morocco, increased in 2014-2015, as did resources earmarked for security measures. In Ceuta and Melilla, this was reflected

**The implementation of controls is externalised to Morocco by Spain, and to France by the UK. This logic is implemented through bilateral agreements and financial assistance.**

on both sides of the border in increased arrests and violence by Moroccan police authorities, including collective arrests that led to arbitrary detentions and the destruction of camps. Furthermore, Morocco erected a fourth barrier in Melilla in 2014 and buttressed it with razor-sharp barbed wire in late May 2015. France and the UK signed two new agreements in September 2014 and August 2015, primarily to tighten security at the Port of Calais (installation of fencing topped with barbed wire along the highway leading to the port area) and the tunnel under the Channel. The size of security forces was also considerably increased.



Security fences along the highway leading to the port of Calais area, slum of Calais, February 2016. © Sara Prestianni

## 1.2 MILITARISATION OF THE MEDITERRANEAN: "SURVEILLANCE IS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF WATCHING OVER"<sup>2</sup>

Just days after the fatal shipwrecks in April 2015, European Heads of State and government officials convened at an extraordinary summit on April 23 and reiterated their "immediate priority": "to make sure that no one else dies at sea". But their initial concrete response was to beef up surveillance at the Italian and Greek maritime borders through the operations of the Frontex agency. Contrary to the ambiguity voluntarily maintained by European political leaders, the purpose of these operations is not sea rescue but surveillance of maritime borders and interception of vessels. Furthermore, the EUNAVFOR Med military operation launched in June 2015 and the decisive NATO operation in the Aegean Sea in February 2016 were officially carried out to stamp out the smugglers in the Mediterranean on whom the EU squarely places the blame for the deaths at sea. Behind all of this hides the true objective of reducing the number of migrants arriving in Europe.

## 1.3 DRAMATIC CONSEQUENCES TO THE SECURITY LOGIC

Deaths at the three borders studied increased in 2014 and in 2015. In 2015, 3,771 people lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea, even though the EU had significantly strengthened its presence in the area that year. In Calais, Ceuta and Melilla, there was an increase in injuries related to attempted crossings, and migrants also suffered physical and psychological violence from security forces and from the inhumane system that impairs their fundamental rights and dignity.

3,771 people lost their lives in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015, whereas the EU had significantly strengthened its presence in the area through Frontex and EUNAVFOR Med.

Barriers to entering and exiting (in the case of Calais) the Schengen Area also cause bottlenecks of migrants at the borders, and they are then forced to live in camps under appalling living conditions. The blocking of the English-French border has led to a scattering and proliferation of relatively large camps inland near Calais and all along the coast of the Channel and the North Sea to Belgium.

In Morocco, the deadlock at the Melilla fence has recently led to an increase in the number of attempts to get into Europe by sea from the northern Moroccan coast or from the city of Laayoune in the south, to try to make the crossing to the Canary Islands, or even via Libya and Algeria.

Finally, border closures benefit the unscrupulous middlemen. "The fight against migrant smuggling" is a priority of European policy, but the more difficult the border is to cross, the more people have to resort to smugglers.

2. "Frontex" inter-associative campaign, press release "Frontex: Controlling or Saving Lives?", October 22, 2013.



Migrants waiting in the Pozzallo hotspot after their landing, Sicily, September 2015. © Sara Prestianni

These security arrangements are legitimised despite the considerable human and economic costs. European politicians use the "pull-factor" argument and play on fears by waving the red flag of invasion to further legitimise the hardening of ineffective policies at an intolerable human cost but which, at the same time, uphold economic, political and electoral interests.

## 02

## Sort and keep away: hotspots and other strategies

Even having overcome all the obstacles to reach European territory, it is not certain that migrants will be allowed to enter Europe. Migrants face various forms of sorting and exclusion mechanisms at the three borders observed.



### 2.1 THE HOTSPOT APPROACH: SORT QUICKLY AND EXPEL

More than places, hotspots are first and foremost an approach that was formally established to implement relocation<sup>3</sup> from Greece and Italy, but that has a much broader function of sorting and controlling migrants arriving at the Greek and Italian borders. Billed as a new response, the hotspot approach is actually a reflection of intensified and systematised sorting that already existed at the borders. The difference is in the stronger and more coordinated intervention of various European agencies such as Frontex and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO).

The use of hotspots raises many questions about how people are identified. This includes an interview to gather information about the person (full name, age, nationality, reasons for coming to Europe) and the taking of fingerprints. During its mission in Italy, La Cimade was able to study the case of the Pozzallo hotspot. Identification interviews usually take place shortly after landing, at a time when people are physically and psychologically exhausted from the sea crossing and their migratory trip. In questioning people about their reasons for coming to Europe, the Italian police – with assistance from Frontex – asks very directed questions in a form that offers limited choices. Five boxes can be checked by Italian police based on individuals' responses to the closed questions asked during the interview: "work", "join family", "escape poverty", "asylum" and "other reasons". Therefore, migrants must choose the "right" reason in order to get into the "right" category, and all during an expedited interview upon landing, sometimes without an interpreter and without proper and comprehensive information on the possibility of applying for asylum. If the person answers yes to the reason of "work" or "escape poverty", then that person is considered to be an "economic migrant" and will not

be allowed to enter EU territory, even if that person might also possibly qualify for refugee status. Furthermore, a tendency to sort people according to their nationality seems to be emerging, in contradiction to the spirit of the international Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, of July 28, 1951<sup>4</sup>. The hotspot approach therefore leads to the implementation of sorting centres where migrants are kept to be identified and registered; a new form of detention facility. The UNHCR and other organisations

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such as Doctors without Borders have decided to cease their activities at the Greek hotspots, where the situation has worsened since the signing of the agreement between the EU and Turkey.

The overrepresentation of police and Frontex forces at the hotspots, compared with relevant asylum stakeholders like EASO, is another example of the nature of these facilities, which seek more to expel than to welcome.

3. Relocation is a temporary mechanism that was adopted by EU Member States in September 2015. It allows the intake of people arriving in Greece and Italy with a "clear need for international protection" (nationalities of first instance asylum-seekers with an EU-wide average recognition rate of 75% or higher) to be shared by several European countries. If they meet this criterion, they can be transferred, based on a distribution key, to other EU Member States where they can apply for asylum. The Member States have committed to relocating 160,000 people over a two-year period.

4. See Part 3: Asylum, a fundamental right to be protected.



Migrants are photographed when landing and filmed before entering the bus, Pozzallo hotspot, Sicily, September 2015. © Sara Prestianni

## 2.2 OTHER WAYS OF SORTING AND KEEPING AWAY IN CALAIS AND IN CEUTA AND MELILLA

In Ceuta and Melilla, asylum application offices opened at the border in March 2015 are one way to sort people. They are presented by the *Guardia Civil* [civil guard], as the counterpart to the legalisation of “hot returns”<sup>5</sup>: people “can safely seek asylum at the border”<sup>6</sup>. Therefore, those who cross the fences are in fact ‘economic migrants’ and can be deported to Morocco without violating the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Yet these asylum offices only seem to be benefitting Syrian or Palestinian asylum seekers from Syria<sup>7</sup>. Indeed, in reality, it is impossible for a person from Sub-Saharan Africa to access these offices because to do so, people must first be able to get out of Morocco. This step, difficult enough for Syrians (some have to use forged documents), is impossible for the people of Sub-Saharan Africa because of the crackdown on Sub-Saharan migrants in the region. To “unclog” Calais and try to discourage people from coming (back), the French government has implemented a dispersal strategy, which is manifested through repressive and other types of mechanisms that are presented as “humanitarian”.

The asylum route is the primary way: the government has introduced measures to encourage those already in Calais to file an application for asylum in France. But there is a repressive component: the use of mass confinement to disperse and drive people away from Calais into different administrative detention centres in France. Furthermore, since October 2015, people are being sent to reception and orientation centres (CAO) in various locations around France, which are often isolated. This ambiguous humanitarian mechanism, actively promoted by the government, provides shelter but also allows “Dublin” asylum seekers to be expelled to other States.

5. Hot returns are a practice of the *Guardia civil*: they intercept people trying to cross the border and return them directly to Morocco, turning them over to Moroccan authorities without a review of their situation. Small doors in the triple fence at the Spanish barrier in Melilla are used for these hot returns. The Security Act adopted in April 2015 by the Spanish Parliament legalises these returns, which are contrary to the principle of non-return of asylum seekers in the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.

6. Interview with the *Guardia civil* of Melilla, June 2015.

7. Of the 1,500 applications filed in Melilla between January and April 2015, not a single one was from an applicant from Sub-Saharan Africa.



Temporary centre with 1,500 spots in containers for migrants in the slum of Calais, February 2016. © Sara Prestianni

## 03

## Asylum – a fundamental right to be protected

Cooperation between EU Member States focuses more on the security aspects of migration policy. Despite attempts at harmonisation since the late 1990s, States are struggling to adopt a common asylum policy.



### 3.1 THE YET-TO-BE-SEEN COOPERATION TO RECEIVE ASYLUM SEEKERS: FROM THE FAILURE OF THE DUBLIN REGULATION TO THE FAILURE OF RELOCATION

The Dublin Regulation, on which the European asylum system is based, was not designed as a mechanism for the fair sharing of responsibilities between Member States<sup>8</sup>. Despite its ineffectiveness and flagrant dysfunctions for many years, it continues to be applied. It instils a climate of deterrence and forces asylum seekers to play the waiting game, often under very difficult conditions, for as long as it takes to identify the State responsible. Associations see the negative impacts and psychological distress it causes every day. Mainly used by Member States for its coercive aspect, the few articles of the Dublin Regulation in favour of asylum seekers (e.g. family criteria that allow a person to apply for asylum in a country where he/she has a relative living), are rarely applied.

In the face of more arrivals, the Dublin system does not stand. Member States have had to bypass it and go through an ad hoc and non-binding mechanism: relocation. This leads to bias issues as to the substance of the right to asylum. The nationality criterion leads to, in hotspots, the sorting of persons in need of protection on the basis of nationality, contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951. This tendency weakens the right to asylum, which is based on the principle of examining the individual situation of each person.

For the time being, the relocation mechanism is not working largely because of tensions between Member States and their lack of political will. Very few are meeting their commitments: as of May 27, 2016, only 1,740 people had been relocated from Greece and Italy, out of a commitment of 160,000. Furthermore, asylum seekers do not trust the system. Many are afraid of giving their fingerprints or do not want to be transferred to a Member State that they cannot choose.

### 3.2 CEUTA AND MELILLA: TREACHEROUS ACCESS TO ASYLUM

The hot returns practiced for years by the Spanish Guardia Civil make access to European territory almost impossible for asylum seekers. This practice

is clearly an obstacle to the right to asylum since people cannot make an application for international protection at the border/fence, and there is no individual examination of their situation. If they manage to enter the enclaves, asylum seekers find themselves locked up and cannot circulate freely throughout the Spanish territory and access the peninsula. Furthermore, there are no rules governing their transfer to the peninsula. In Ceuta, they must wait several months, a wait that deters many from seeking asylum, and even drives some to abandon their claim.

### 3.3 INADEQUATE AND DETERRING RECEPTION CONDITIONS

The reception systems of the three countries studied are complex in their operation due to the diversity of the facilities and the structures receiving asylum seekers, particularly in Italy. Furthermore, the reception conditions (housing, food, clothing, etc.) of the asylum seekers do not always comply with EU law and vary widely between the facilities and structures that manage them. For example, in Italy, the basic services required by European law are non-existent in some centres, such as Mineo in Sicily, characterised by its police presence and mafia ties. Finally, social, legal and psychological assistance for asylum seekers is generally inadequate, even though migrants suffer from trauma related to their exile and migratory journey.

Not having reception conditions for asylum seekers that are too "attractive" is a strategy used by several European States. This logic of deterrence seriously impairs the fundamental rights of asylum seekers and implements a form of institutional violence, forcing people to live and try to survive in disgraceful conditions.

8. This regulation determines the State responsible for processing the asylum application filed by a person, which is supposed to be the country of first arrival, and provides for rules the transfer of the asylum seeker to that country. Deeply unfair, it places the burden of reception responsibility on the Member States at the borders outside the Schengen Area, which are entry points to the EU where fingerprints are supposed to be registered in the Eurodac database.

## 04

## The legal boundary: circumvented laws and violated rights

Sometimes the law is ignored, bypassed, not respected or even used as a tool to legalise practices hitherto illegal. The lack of legal condemnation of these illegal practices and of the perpetrators of these rights violations hints at ingrained impunity, thereby legitimating the violations and making them more acceptable in the eyes of many.



### 4.1 LEGAL UNCERTAINTY THAT BENEFITS THE EU MEMBER STATES

The hotspot approach, put in place through EU policy documents only, without a legislative procedure involving the European Parliament has no clear legal basis and formal legal status guaranteeing the fundamental rights of migrants in these places. They are deprived of their freedoms in order to be identified and registered, sometimes without review by the courts, particularly in Italy, and without legal support from associations or lawyers.

The abundance of stakeholders in the control of the external maritime borders of the Schengen Area – particularly in Greece and Italy – patrolled both by the European agency Frontex and Member States, poses a problem particularly for establishing responsibility for rights violations; a question that also arises in the case of shipwrecks. The Mediterranean Sea is crisscrossed by many ships, in addition to Frontex and Member State vessels (merchant marine, NATO military ships, EUNAVFOR Med ships, etc.). How can there be so many deadly shipwrecks given the number of stakeholders criss-crossing the sea? Who is responsible for not having come to the rescue? What reparations exist for the victims?

### 4.2 CIRCUMVENTING THE LAW: DETENTION TO “EMPTY OUT CALAIS”

To get migrants out of Calais and discourage them from returning, the French government has abusively and illegally been using administrative detention. Nearly 1,200 people have been forcibly detained and dispersed in seven administrative detention centres

outside the Pas-de-Calais in 2015. Most of these were from countries at war to which deportation is not theoretically possible (Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, Sudan). Almost all of the people locked up have been released. The French administration escapes the censure of justice by releasing people within the five-day period beyond which applying for an extension of detention from the judge for freedom and detention would be required. This practice denies people access to their rights and undermines their dignity. These people have, for the most part, returned to Calais upon their release.

### 4.3 LEGALISATION OF PRACTICES THAT VIOLATE RIGHTS AND IMPUNITY IN CEUTA AND MELILLA

The “hot returns” practiced for years by the Spanish Guardia Civil, in collaboration with the Moroccan authorities, were legalised on April 1, 2015 through an amendment to Spain’s legislation on foreigners. This practice, however, remains illegal under international conventions ratified by the Spanish State, which give rights to migrants, especially asylum seekers. In fact, this “legalisation” has resulted in little change on the ground. But it helps to “protect” officers against potential lawsuits. Since the adoption of the law, there has been no prosecution resulting in the conviction of any Guardia Civil officers for their actions. The cases were closed and some of the officers concerned were even awarded the Cross of Merit by the Spanish Government for their service at the Melilla border...

## 05

## Borders: against all odds, places of solidarity and mobilisation



Migrants and volunteers in the slum of Calais, February 2016. © Sara Prestianni

### 5.1 THE BORDER AS A PLACE OF SOLIDARITY AND RESISTANCE

On either side of the border, solidarities are being woven. Associations, citizens and migrants are mobilising. Despite the difficulties in taking action, activist associations and groups have been on the ground for years, either in Calais and on the northern coast of France, or in England, Italy, Spain and Morocco. Every day they provide support to migrants forced to survive and live in difficult conditions, and defend and help them to exercise their rights. They analyse the migration policies in place and sound the alarm on the rights violations they may incur.

Although Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, said that the rise in the number of refugees is, according to him, "the biggest fear in Europe today", solidarity actions and citizen mobilisations grew significantly in 2015, on top of those of associations and groups that have been working with migrants for years. This trend is in contrast to the political discourse, which some political leaders are careful not to emphasise. To give just two examples, in Calais there has been an explosion of solidarity actions by the inhabitants of the region, and British citizens have been flocking to the slums since the summer of 2015. Various initiatives developed by citizens have also emerged in Italy to welcome migrants in transit or to carry out sea rescue operations.

French and European migration policies are established without consultation or the participation of migrants. Yet they are well aware of the impact of European policies on their migration route, and have claims on the policy choices that affect them. Through demonstrations, hunger strikes and other means of action, they are attempting to fight an unfair fight against a system that does not allow them to participate.

### 5.2 SOLIDARITIES THAT BOTHER?

These initiatives are weakened by removal and exclusion policies enacted by the States. Administrative obstacles, intimidation and violence, repressed and criminalised actions are all practices that attempt to discourage collective mobilisation and weaken solidarity between migrants and associations. In Ceuta, associations and activists are under pressure and it is extremely difficult to conduct activities, and especially to get funding as a rights advocacy organisation. In Italy, it is very difficult or almost impossible for some to gain access to migrant reception centres. In Calais, a by-law was passed to almost systematically issue fines to vehicles belonging to associations or volunteers parked on the road beside the slum. Just like the migrants, the people helping them face intimidation and violence by security forces and from individuals belonging to far-right groups. The prosecutions of activists and citizens who find themselves being criminalised for showing solidarity with migrants reflect the reactivation of the "crime of solidarity".

European migration policies are established without consultation or without effective consideration of the opinions of migrants and associations and are an illustration of the extensive deficit in democratic control in this area. In general, it is difficult for associations to get access to information, and to know what is actually happening in some places at the external borders of the EU and in Member States. It is difficult, sometimes impossible, for those helping migrants to access certain places.

# CONCLUSION

Calais, Melilla, the Italian maritime borders or the agreement that the EU signed with Turkey, all symbolise the violence towards migrants of European migration policy. Prioritising border protection rather than the protection of the men, women and children trying to cross those borders, the EU and its Member States are violating fundamental rights. By bargaining and collaborating with the EU, neighbouring countries such as Morocco and Turkey are also responsible for the brutal toll on migrants.

The drama at the borders will not cease until the EU and its Member States change the direction of their policies, and as long as they continue to focus resources on restricting access to their territory at the expense of admission policies. A change of perspective on migration is urgently required. Rather than crying invasion, the EU and its Member States should initiate positive dialogue on migration and improve the transparency and democratic control of their migration policies.

## Recommendations

La Cimade is asking the European Union and its Member States to:

1. Learn from the failure and intolerable human cost of European policies enacted over the last two decades, and establish a new policy that focuses resources on the reception and protection of migrants and on true reflection that will allow the practical implementation of the freedom of movement.
2. Unconditionally respect and apply international law and European legislation enshrining the right to asylum and guaranteeing the fundamental rights of migrants: the right to asylum, the right to leave any country, including one's own and to return, the right not to suffer inhumane or degrading treatment, the right not to be arbitrarily detained, etc.
3. Stop using the fight against terrorism, human smuggling and human trafficking as a means to legitimise control and repression operations and the restriction of the fundamental rights of migrants and EU citizens.
4. End the externalisation policy that results in rights violations and violence, and forces migrants to take bigger risks. In particular, the EU should go back on its agreement with Turkey.
5. Stop discriminatory and repressive sorting practices, especially in hotspots and in the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Guarantee effective access to asylum offices at the Ceuta and Melilla borders for anyone in need of international protection, without discrimination, by ceasing border blocking and filtering practices.
6. Acknowledge the failure of the Dublin Regulation and relocation mechanism, and establish a true policy for receiving asylum seekers. The European Commission should strongly condemn Member States that do not respect their asylum obligations and that misuse European funds dedicated to receiving asylum seekers.
7. Banish the impunity surrounding violence against migrants and practices that violate fundamental rights, including the obligation of "non-refoulement" of asylum seekers. As such, Spain must review its legislation on citizen security, which attempts to legalise collective expulsions.
8. Support civil society actions, recognise its right of scrutiny and allow access to hotspots and other centres for foreigners. End the criminalisation of activists and the "crime of solidarity" in all its forms.
9. Encourage the solidarities that are being developed, and open a positive dialogue on migration rather than upholding fears and divisions. The salvation of our societies depends on it.

# APPENDICES

## THE "MIGRANCY" OF MOHAMMAD

This map was produced based on an interview conducted by La Cimade with Mohammad in the Dubrulle jungle on February 11, 2015. A Pashto interpreter translated the story. Threatened in Afghanistan, Mohammad's family asked him to go to Europe and paid for the trip. At the time of the interview, he was 22 years old, spoke English and hoped to reach the U.K. where he lived from the age of 15 to 18.



## RESOURCES

### Recent NGOs related reports

#### CEUTA AND MELILLA

- APDHA, *Droits de l'Homme à la frontière Sud*, 2015.
- GADEM, *Migreurop*, APDHA, La Cimade, *Ceuta et Melilla, centres de tri à ciel ouvert aux portes de l'Afrique*, décembre 2015.
- Migreurop/GADEM, *Gérer la frontière euro-africaine. Melilla, laboratoire de l'externalisation des frontières de l'UE au Maroc*, 2015.

#### CALAIS

- France Terre d'Asile, *Les migrants et le Calais, quelle sortie de crise ?*, octobre 2014.
- Human Rights Watch, *France : les migrants et les demandeurs d'asile victimes de violences et démunis*, janvier 2015.
- Secours catholique, « Je ne savais même pas où allait notre barque », *Paroles d'exiliés à Calais*, mars 2015.

#### ITALY

- MEDU, *Move or Die, Migratory Routes from Sub-Saharan Countries to Europe*, août 2015.

### Institutional/university reports

#### CEUTA AND MELILLA

- Comité européen pour la prévention de la torture et des peines ou traitements inhumains ou dégradants, rapport de sa visite en Espagne, avril 2015.
- Université Complutense de Madrid, *Rechazos en frontera : frontera sin derechos ?*, Rapport sur les renvois à la frontière, avril 2015.

#### CALAIS

- Défenseur des droits, *Exilés et droits fondamentaux : la situation sur le territoire de Calais*, octobre 2015.
- CNCDDH, *Avis sur la situation des migrants à Calais et dans le Calaisis*, juillet 2015.
- Contrôleur général des lieux de privation de liberté, *Recommandations en urgence relatives aux déplacements collectifs de personnes étrangères interpellées à Calais*, 2 décembre 2015.

#### ITALY

- Charles Heller, Lorenzo Pezzani, *Ebbing and Flowing: The EU's Shifting Practices of (Non) Assistance and Bordering in a Time of Crisis*, février 2016.

### Websites

- Passeurs d'hospitalités – des exilés à Calais : [passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com](http://passeursdhospitalites.wordpress.com)
- Migreurop : [migreurop.org](http://migreurop.org)
- Portail du HCR sur la situation en Méditerranée : [data.unhcr.org/mediterranean](http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean)

## Filmography

- Laetitia Tura et Hélène Crouzillat, *Les Messagers*, 2014, 70 minutes.
- Association Prodein, *Melilla, Apagón de los Derechos Humanos*, 2015, 10 minutes.
- Charles Heller et Lorenzo Pezzani, *Liquid Traces, The Left-to-Die Boat Case*, 2014, 17 minutes.

## INTERVIEWS AND VISITS

### CALAIS

- Audasse, plateforme d'accueil des demandeurs d'asile - responsable.
- Calais Migrant Solidarity - deux membres du mouvement.
- Centre Jules-Ferry - directeur.
- CGT port de Calais - secrétaire général (entretien téléphonique).
- Chambre de commerce et d'industrie de la Côte d'Opale - Port de Calais - président.
- Direction départementale de la police aux frontières - directeur adjoint.
- L'Auberge des Migrants - bénévole de l'association.
- Mairie de Calais - premier adjoint au maire.
- Médecins du Monde - salarié.
- Ministère de l'intérieur - directeur général des étrangers en France.
- Mairie de Calais - premier adjoint au maire.
- Médecins du Monde - salarié.
- Ministère de l'intérieur - directeur général des étrangers en France.
- OFII (Office français de l'immigration et de l'intégration) - directeur départemental et représentants du bureau de Calais.
- Passeurs d'hospitalités - auteur du blog.
- Plateforme de service aux migrants - salariés et présidente.
- Préfecture du Pas-de-Calais - préfète et chef de Cabinet adjoint.
- Secours catholique - salariés.
- Solid'R (association gérant l'ancien foyer pour les femmes et les enfants) - directeur.
- Terre d'Errance Norrent-Fontes - salariés et bénévoles de l'association.
- Entretien avec des migrants.
- Visite des campements (à Calais et Norrent-Fontes), du bidonville, du centre Jules-Ferry et de l'ancien foyer pour femmes géré par Solid'R.

### Additional interviews conducted outside of the missions:

- France Terre d'Asile - salariés intervenant au CRA de Coquelles.
- HCR - représentants à Paris.

### CEUTA AND MELILLA

- ACCEM (Asociación comisión católica española de migración) - responsable de l'association (à Melilla).
- Association de gardes civils AUGC (Association unifiée de gardes civils) - responsables (à Melilla).
- Brigade des étrangers et des frontières de la police nationale - responsables (à Ceuta et à Melilla)
- CEAR (Comisión española de ayuda al refugiado) - avocats de l'association (à Ceuta et à Melilla).
- CETI - directeurs des centres à Ceuta et à Melilla.
- Croix-Rouge - responsable de la section à Melilla.
- ELÍN - membres de l'association (à Ceuta).
- Guardia civil - responsables (à Ceuta et à Melilla).
- HCR - représentants à Ceuta et à Melilla.
- PRODEIN (Pro derechos de la infancia) - membres de l'association (à Melilla).
- Entretien avec des migrants (à Ceuta et à Melilla).
- Visite des CETI (à Ceuta et à Melilla).
- Observation de la barrière et visite de la salle de contrôle de la Guardia civil (à Melilla).
- Visite du bureau asile (à Melilla).
- ARCI Rome - salariées responsables du numéro vert (où les migrants appellent pour obtenir des conseils) (Rome).
- ARCI Syracuse - responsable de l'antenne.
- ASGI (associazione per gli studi giuridici su'll immigrazione - association) - avocats (Milan).
- Borderline Sicily - militante de l'association (Catane).
- Centre Aldini (centre d'accueil qui fait partie d'un projet soutenu par la mairie de Milan pour l'accueil des migrants en transit) - directrice et salariée chargée de l'assistance juridique.
- Centre Baobab - bénévole (centre autogéré d'accueil des Erythréens en transit).
- Commission extraordinaire aux personnes disparues - commissaire nommé par le gouvernement italien (Rome).
- LABANOF, laboratoire scientifique de médecine légale de l'université de Milan - responsable du laboratoire (Milan).
- Mairie de Catane - vice-maire.
- Médecins sans frontières - responsable des projets en Sicile.
- MEDU (medici per i diritti umani - association médicale) - salariés.
- Militante sur les disparus en mer - membre de l'association ARCI (Milan).
- Militante sur les disparus en mer - membre individuelle de Migreurop (Milan).
- NAGA (Associazione Volontaria di Assistenza Socio-Sanitaria e per i Diritti di Cittadini Stranieri, Rom e Sinti onlus) - salariées et bénévoles de l'association (Milan).
- Rete Antirazzista (réseau anti-raciste) - militants de l'association (Catane).
- Task force régionale européenne (EURTF - coordonnée par Frontex et chargée de la mise en œuvre des hotspots en Italie) - représentants de Frontex, d'Europol, du ministère de l'intérieur italien, de la police italienne, de la marine italienne (Catane).
- Entretien avec des migrants à Catane et hébergés dans le CARA (centre d'accueil pour demandeurs d'asile) de Mineo.
- Visite du CAS (centre d'accueil extraordinaire) de Torre di Canicarao avec MEDU (Sicile).
- Visite du centre Baobab (Rome).
- Observation d'un débarquement de 700 personnes au CPSA de Pozzallo (devenu hotspot).
- Observation de l'extérieur du CARA de Mineo.

# Calais: an uncertain humanitarian response and continued repression


Given the lack of French/British willingness to welcome exiles in Calais with dignity to avoid the so-called "pull factors", the same pattern has been repeating itself for over 15 years: arrival of new exiles, tightening of border controls and implementation of emergency measures, saturation of shelters and growth of camps and squats, police violence and dismantling of camps, dispersal of exiles, return, then arrival of new exiles, tighter security controls, development of new camps, violence and dismantling of those new camps, etc. The French government has been padding the humanitarian component since 2015, mainly talking up its sheltering actions, but at the same time it continues its strategy of repression and deterrence to empty Calais.

Opening of the "humanitarian reception centre" in Sangatte, a temporary measure planned for 80 people.

Promotion of asylum by the French government, exiles are encouraged to file their applications in France.  
Opening of the Jules Ferry centre (meals, showers, shelter for women and children).

Shelter and dispersal of exiles to reception and orientation centres (CAO) across France.

Opening of a temporary ultra-controlled centre with 1,500 spots in containers.  
Continued promotion of asylum and CAOs.



Sangatte camp dismantled. France and the UK divide up the exiles in exchange for tighter controls by France.

Signing of Le Touquet Treaty and of an administrative arrangement: tighter border controls, resting primarily on France; the UK finances migrant detection equipment.

Evacuation and destruction of the Calais "jungle" and other camps.  
New administrative arrangement: the UK finances the latest detection technologies in exchange for France's commitment to tighten controls and reduce the number of migrants in the Calais region.

New wave of dismantling of exiles' survival places: police violence, arrests and detentions.

Agreement to tighten security at the Port of Calais: installation of protective fencing on the port ring road.

Ultimatum of authorities issued to exiles to evacuate squats and settle beside the Jules Ferry centre.

Agreement to tighten security at the Eurotunnel site and block the border.


Mass arrests and placements in administrative detention centres to disperse exiles far from Calais.

Evacuation of the southern zone of the slum.


## RESPONSES TO THE SITUATION IN CALAIS

- Emergency and humanitarian responses
- Repression and violence: destruction of camps, etc.
- Cooperation between France and the United Kingdom to tighten border controls

### THE MELILLA BORDER FENCE



### SECURITY FENCES AND MEASURES IN CALAIS





Migrant walking in the southern zone of the slum of Calais evacuated in February 2016. © Sara Prestianni

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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### Partner organisations



### With the support of

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## La Cimade

### To assist migrants and defend their rights

Every year, La Cimade receives and advises tens of thousands of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in its reception centres. It also provides housing to two hundred refugees and asylum seekers in its two shelters located in Béziers and Massy.

### To act for detained foreign nationals

La Cimade works in more than 10 Administrative Retention Centres and provides legal support to foreigners, assisting them in accessing their rights. La Cimade also works in about a hundred prisons.

### To build International Solidarity

La Cimade implements projects for the defence of migrants and refugees' rights together with partner associations in Southern countries. It also promotes the construction of peace especially in Israel-Palestine.

### To bear witness, inform and mobilize

La Cimade leads advocacy actions towards decision makers; it informs and raises awareness on migrations among the public opinion through its cène festival and Causes Communes magazine. La Cimade makes propositions for a change in the migratory policies.

### 2016 – some figures

- 100 000 persons receiving advices, support or housing
- 131 reception centres and French language programmes
- 2 000 volunteers in 83 local groups, 13 regions
- 14 partner associations in 8 countries (Algeria, Ivory Cost, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Tunisia)



All these actions are possible thanks to our donors: they guarantee the independence of our association and its freedom of speech.

### To support La Cimade:

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